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Abstract 
The Chinese stimulus package of 2008 was a response by the government to 
rebound the second largest economy from the effects of the Global Financial Crisis. The 
package was one of the largest, and arguably one of the most successful, in boosting 
demand and spurring growth through targeting infrastructure projects and consumer 
spending. This paper investigates whether the package had any spillover effects on the 
US industrial and consumption companies with large markets in China through the time 
series multiple regression technique. This paper found that Chinese net exports had some 
explanatory power over the consumption companies, and the US industrial companies 
were hurt by the stimulus package. The findings also suggest that there are more 
macroeconomic variables that have more explanatory power over the returns of the 
companies than the ones included in the regressions.  
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I. Introduction 
 The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 led to a dramatic drop in consumer 
wealth, rising and prolonged unemployment, failures of key businesses, and sluggish 
international trade that may have contributed to the European sovereign-debt crisis. The 
enormous rise in demand, and associated surge in asset prices, that characterized the 
financial crisis resulted from a period of low interest rates, over-leveraging, and 
incompetent regulations.  
During the early 2000s, investors turned to investing in collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) backed by subprime mortgages, which offered high yields and “low” 
risk according to its Triple-A rating (Poole, 2010). In addition, the federal government 
pushed two Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
accept more subprime mortgages, thereby raising the number of families who owned 
their own homes in America. The steady rise in housing prices and the low interest rates 
encouraged more and more mortgages, eventually creating an unsustainable housing 
bubble. In 2006, as house prices leveled and rates began to rise for adjustable-rate 
mortgages, families began defaulting on their mortgages, creating enough pressure to 
burst the bubble. The housing securities plummeted, and due to the interconnectedness of 
financial institutions, spread the damage globally through an interbank credit crisis.  
There were two major channels that indirectly spread the crisis to the emerging 
market economies. Financial institutions, which had invested heavily in the housing-
related assets, suffered huge losses, caused a flight to safety in which large amounts of 
capital were withdrawn from many emerging economies (Zhang, Willet and Li, 2012). 
Ironically, these emerging economies had invested little in these toxic securities and had 
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few direct relationships to the real estate market. Thus, capital was much safer in these 
markets than back in the developed nations. The flight to safety happened on such a 
large-scale that in the last two months of 2008, there were many occasions when 
Treasury Bills were in such high demand, driving down yields to zero (Poole, 2010). 
Moreover, as the advanced nations—most notably the US—fell into recession, their 
demands for imports fell drastically, thereby dragging emerging economies into 
recessions as well. For the first time in six decades, global Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) contracted; in 2009, the contraction was estimated to be approximately 1.1 percent 
of GDP. Growth in the emerging markets decelerated to 3.1 percent, whereas 
industrialized countries experienced a contraction in their economies of 3.3 percent 
(McKissack & Xu, 2011).  
 
Impact of the Financial Crisis on China and the US 
Prior to the crisis, China’s growth rate was 12.7 percent in 2006 and 14.2 percent 
in 2007. Although China’s economy did not contract and maintained relatively high 
growth through the crisis, with a record 9.6 percent in 2008 and 9.2 percent in 2009, 
China’s economy was not insulated from the crisis, and suffered on levels comparable to 
the developed nations (Willet 2011). In absolute terms, China’s growth rate fell 
drastically more than the US’s relative to its trend in previous periods. In 2008, the value 
of China’s deviation from the trend was approximately -3.4 percentage points, while the 
US’s was -2.5 percentage points (Zhang, Willett and Li, 2012).  
China was able to maintain relatively high growth for a variety of reasons. First, 
the nation was sheltered more than other nations from the crisis. China realized only half 
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the spillover effects from the channels that spread the crisis to the emerging economies. 
China was mostly immune to the effects of the foreign investors’ flight to safety. The 
beginning of the financial crisis led to short term financial outflows of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) that later recuperated to pre-crisis levels in 2010. However, given that 
40 percent of China’s GDP consisted of exports, its economy was hard hit by the decline 
in demand from the advanced economies.  
During the month that the Chinese government implemented the stimulus 
program, China’s export growth rate fell to -2.2 percent from 20 percent in the previous 
month, totaling a loss of 17 percent in growth in 2009 (Zhang, Willett and Li, 2012). 
Second, China was in a strong position to counteract the crisis effect through fiscal 
support. After the Asian Crisis of the late 1990’s, China had accumulated massive 
amounts of foreign exchange reserves, reinforced their financial markets, and minimized 
their budget deficits. This allowed China to implement a large stabilization program 
without concerns over borrowing costs and whether their financial institutions could 
sustain such pressure.  
 
China Stimulus Package 
   To counteract the effects of the crisis, most countries injected some form of 
stimulus into their markets. On November 10, 2008, the government of the People’s 
Republic of China implemented one of the largest stimulus packages, resulting in an 
additional 2-3 percent to GDP in 2009 and 2010 (McKissack & Xu, 2011). China was in 
a powerful position to respond to the financial crisis—it had access to a lot of capital for 
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macroeconomic policies, control of the banking sector and exchange rates, and a 
substantial need for development and infrastructure.  
 The stimulus package allocated RMB 4 trillion ($586 B in 2008 dollars) or 13.3 
percent of 2008 GDP on infrastructure and development projects, but also included 
projects that were slated to occur regardless of the state of the economy. The IMF 
estimated the figure to be around RMB 2 trillion, or approximately 3 percent of the GDP 
of 2009 and 2010 when adjusted for these projects (McKissack & Xu, 2011). Unlike the 
US stimulus package, which focused solely on tax-related policy to increase the 
disposable income of consumers and spur spending, China’s stimulus package also 
targeted development and infrastructure. Approximately 72 percent of the stimulus 
package targeted infrastructure, with the bulk of it spent on re-construction after the 
Sichuan earthquake and on development of high-speed railways. In addition, the package 
also included government support policies for 10 Pillar Industries, industries deemed by 
the government to be vital to China’s economic growth, including tax cuts and incentives, 
industry subsidies and consumer subsidies to encourage the purchase of certain products, 
as well as fiscal support (Morrison, 2009). These policies were aimed at encouraging 
consumer spending, and combined with the multiplier effect, rebound the economy.  
In terms of monetary policy, the Chinese government focused on lending targets, 
the Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR), and capital inflows. The banking sector is 
dominated by several large state-owned banks, meaning that the interest rates and lending 
quotas are essentially set by the central government. To control liquidity, the People’s 
Bank of China (PBoC) increased lending targets from RMB 4.7 trillion in 2008 to RMB 
10 trillion in 2009. In addition, the RRR was lowered by 17.5 percent for smaller banks 
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and by 15.5 percent for larger banks (McKissack & Xu, 2011). The difference in the 
changes in the RRR can be attributed to the structure of the large and small banks. 
Because larger banks tend to hold more reserves than is prescribed by the RRR, they are 
constrained by lending, whereas smaller banks have less capital, and are thus constrained 
by the RRR. The third monetary policy involves exchange rate management. To control 
fluctuations in its currency rates, the central government sterilized a majority of these 
foreign exchange reserves. The government was even able to realize large profits from its 
sterilization operations initially, but with the advent of the financial crisis, low interest 
rates on foreign assets made sterilization more expensive. China was forced to reduce 
their sterilization activity, thereby creating more liquidity in the banking system.  
The stimulus package was subsidized in part by the central government, and the 
balance was funded by local governments. The central government paid for an estimated 
30 percent of the package through the expansion of the budget. The budget was expanded 
from 0.75 percent in 2008 to 2.75 percent in 2009.  Similarly, because local governments 
were barred from borrowing directly from banks, they were able to create Local 
Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) using public land as collateral to finance 
approximately two-thirds of the package (McKissack and Xu, 2011). 
This paper studies the impact of the Chinese stimulus package on the stock 
returns of numerous construction and consumption companies in the US S&P 500. This 
paper’s findings may have great implications for US investors—even to those who do not 
hold any Asian equities—because of the increasing integration between the two most 
dominant economies. If Chinese macroeconomic policies can affect the stock returns of 
US companies, investors should be attentive to and account for changes in Chinese policy 
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in their models to accurately and effectively forecast their portfolio returns. While the 
results of the study may not be completely definitive, it would not be prudent to disregard 
the findings of this study.  
 
II. Related Literature  
Burdekin and Weidenmier (2013) studied the effects of the Chinese stimulus 
package on Chinese companies. First, their study considered which of the sectors—which 
they computed manually by individually aggregating the Shanghai Composite companies 
into thirteen indices—benefitted from the stimulus package. Then they tested for any 
spillover effects in other markets by testing whether companies headquartered in 
Mainland China, and listed in the Hong Kong Hang Seng index or the US S&P 500 
experienced any effects.  
They found that of the thirteen sectors in the Shanghai equity market, only three 
of them experienced abnormal returns from the 2008 stimulus package in China: Building 
Materials, Heavy Construction, and Real Estate Investment and Services. The fact that 
these three sectors are related to real estate and infrastructure is not surprising, given that 
the majority of the stimulus package was funneled into building infrastructure and other 
construction projects. The absence of additional gains in the other sectors indicated that 
local investors did not expect the stimulus program to have any spillover effects or other 
positive effects on the other industries. Furthermore, they determined that the sectors that 
experienced short-term abnormal returns in Hong Kong were the Building Materials and 
Heavy Construction indices. After computing the event studies and time series, they 
determined that the statistically significant sectors led to a property bubble, rather than 
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repairing the economy, thereby suggesting that government stimulus programs, 
regardless of their magnitude, are rarely effective in mending the economy.  
 Goh et al. (2012) determined that US economic variables had immense predictive 
power in forecasting abnormal returns in the Chinese stock market only after—but not 
prior to—China’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. They 
speculated that this was attributed to a transmission mechanism from the world market to 
China’s economy, as its markets became freer and more open in 2001. The paper 
spotlighted China’s admission as the event of interest, not only because of the lack of 
literature that studied the particular event from the perspective of China, but also because 
of the magnitude and significance of the event. After China’s admission, the economy 
became increasingly integrated with other major markets (Johansson, 2009). Because the 
US is the largest economy in the world and China’s largest trading partner, the country 
naturally increased their integration with the US. Goh et al. hypothesized that this would 
enable the US variables to better predict the stock returns in the Chinese stock market.  
First the paper determined whether the financial and accounting variables could 
predict the behavior of the Chinese stock market using fourteen US variables that include 
the dividend-price ratio, earnings-price ratio, Sharpe Ratio, and term and default spreads. 
Then they determined whether those variables could supplement the nine Chinese 
economic variables in predicting the stock market. The study found that post-admission, 
US variables were able to effectively predict the Chinese stock market for twelve out of 
the thirteen industries; the variables could not predict the Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing industry. The paper suggests that if investors and financial institutions consider 
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both US and Chinese variables in their conventional predictive regression models, they 
can more effectively and accurately estimate their future returns and act accordingly. 
 There are also a multitude of studies that have studied the linkages between the 
equity markets of China and the US using the cointegration and contagion technique. 
Kasa (1992) found a single, common stochastic trend in the US, Japanese, UK, and 
Canadian equity markets. Tian (2007) determined that a long-term equilibrium 
relationship between Chinese A-shares, but not B-shares, and US shares formed after the 
Asian Financial Crisis. Burdekin (2010) utilized the Chow contagion test to determine 
that the recent growth of the Shanghai market led to greater integration with other 
regional and world markets. Cheng and Glascock (2005) examined the relationship 
among the stock markets of the three Greater China Economic Area (GCEA) and the 
stock markets of two developed markets: Japan and the US. They determined that the 
markets of Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have a weak nonlinear relationship 
with the developed markets, but are not cointegrated with either of them. They also 
concluded that the US has a larger effect on the GCEA economies than Japan does, but 
Hong Kong experiences great susceptibility than the other two GCEA markets. Wang and 
Firth (2004) studied the transmission of returns and volatilities across the four stock 
markets in the Greater China area and the three developed markets of Tokyo, London, 
and New York by employing the GARCH model. They concluded that the spillover 
effect is mostly unidirectional, from the developed economies to the Chinese stock 
markets, until after the Asian Financial Crisis, which caused the effects to become bi-
directional. 
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This study will complement the existing literature by providing a fresh 
perspective on the link between the macroeconomic variables of China and the equity 
market in the US.  
 
III. Data and Methodology 
This paper will employ a time-series multiple regression technique to study the 
explanatory power of US and Chinese variables on the returns of S&P 500 companies. 
The sample period encompasses the years 1981 to 2012, and includes the levels of returns 
for the indices prior to the crisis to establish a baseline, during the crisis, and after the 
policy intervention, which allows for comparison to determine if there were any 
statistically significant shifts post-implementation. 
This paper focuses on the industries that may experience the greatest effects from 
the implementation of the stabilization policy: Industrial and Consumer Goods & 
Services. Within these industries, thirteen companies were selected based on their 
relatively large and well-established market in China, as they would experience the 
greatest effects, if any.  
Table 1 contains a chart of the companies and their respective industry category. 
The annual prices of the companies, gathered from the Bloomberg Terminal, were then 
aggregated to form revised indices weighted by their market capitalization. Their returns 
were then adjusted for the common market component by reducing the annual returns by 
the S&P returns of that year. These returns formed the dependent variables for the 
consumption (RETCONS) and infrastructure index (RETINFR).  
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Figure 1 contains a chart of the returns of both sectors, as well as the returns of 
the S&P. It is evident that both indices are affected by the same business cycle, as they 
have similar co-movements over time. However, a brief period after 2008, the indices 
diverge; the industrial index experiences a small spike in returns, while the consumption 
index continues to fall. One’s first reaction would be to assume that the spike is indicative 
of the success of the stimulus package in boosting demand, and counteracting the 
downward trend. An alternative explanation for this phenomenon may be that the 
stimulus package may have pushed up the purchases of construction-related goods in 
2008 from 2011, thereby causing the industry to experience artificial gains that 
eventually corrected itself in the future through relatively lower returns.  
The returns of the indices will be regressed on the following variables: the second 
order condition of US consumption levels (UCONS), changes in Chinese consumption 
levels (CCONS), changes in US Net Exports (UNETEX), changes in Chinese Net 
Exports (CNETEX), changes in US Government Spending (UGOVTS), changes in 
Chinese Government Spending (CGOVTS), changes in US private investment (UINV), 
and changes in Chinese private investment (CINV). There will also be an indicator 
function for the Chinese stimulus package (CSTIM); years prior to the stimulus package 
receive a value of 0, and years after the package’s implementation on November 2008 are 
assigned a value of 1. All observations are denoted in nominal values and US Dollars 
(CGOVTS and CCONS were converted to US$ from Chinese Renminbi using the World 
Bank’s official exchange rate). Any additional notes on the independent variables are 
found in Table 2. 
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Autocorrelation and Multicollinearity 
A correlogram was used to determine whether autocorrelation existed for any of 
the independent variables at the 5% level. Because the variable for the US consumption 
(UCONS) and its previous values were determined to be correlated, the variable was 
adjusted by taking the second order condition to remove the correlative effects. Figure 2 
and Figure 3 contains the results of the correlogram for the first order condition, and 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 contains the results for the second order condition. With the 
adjustment, none of the lags are correlated at the 5% level.  
In addition, after computing a correlation matrix for all the independent and 
dependent variables, it was determined that both independent variables experienced 
multicollinearity. The correlation may have arisen due to the same underlying economic 
variables in the same market affecting the variables. To remedy the problem, the returns 
for the indices (RETCONS and RETINFR) were adjusted by the S&P returns of that 
year. The adjusted correlation matrix is found in Figure 6.  
 
Empirical Models 
This paper will analyze four different regressions. The first two start small with 
two independent variables, and the third and fourth regressions build upon those with 
more complex models. The first time-series regression is expressed as 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! + 𝑢! , 𝑡 = 1981,… ,2012  
where 𝛽! represents the height of the regression, 𝛽!,… ,𝛽! represents the 
coefficients of the 1st independent variable to the kth independent variable, u is known as 
the error term, and t denotes the year ranging from 1981 to 2012. Since the US and 
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Chinese consumption variables are most likely to be the biggest predictors on the 
consumption index returns, the regression will first start from these specifications.   
Similarly, the second regression also begins with basic specifications for the 
infrastructure index, and uses investment rather than consumption. It is written as  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑈𝐼𝑁𝑉! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉! + 𝑢! , 𝑡 = 1981,… ,2012 
The third regression adds more independent variables to increase the explaining 
ability on the returns on the consumption index: 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! +   𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑀! + 𝛽!𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐸𝑋!+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐸𝑋! + 𝛽!𝑈𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑆! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑆! + 𝛽!𝑈𝐼𝑁𝑉! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉!+ 𝑢! , 𝑡 = 1981,… ,2012 
Similarly, the regression for the infrastructure index is as follows: 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! +   𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑀! + 𝛽!𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐸𝑋!+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐸𝑋! + 𝛽!𝑈𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑆! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑆! + 𝛽!𝑈𝐼𝑁𝑉! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉!+ 𝑢! , 𝑡 = 1981,… ,2012 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
Summary Statistics 
The results for the summary statistics are contained in Figure 7. It is interesting to 
note that the standard deviation and range for the variable for the Chinese net exports 
(CNETEX) is extremely large, compared to the other variables. The minimum value of -
380.5 was the change in net exports from 1981 to 1982. To satisfy food demands, the 
Chinese government has been importing large amounts of wheat, reaching a historical 
high during the early 1980’s, and creating a large trade imbalance (Halbrendt & 
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Gempesaw, 1990). The outlier caused the standard deviation to be significantly higher 
with a value of 67.34, while the other variables had a tight distribution and a standard 
deviation of less than 1. 
 
Results 
 The time-series multiple regressions allows the study to explore the determinants 
of the returns of the indices over time. The results for all four regressions are shown in 
Table 3.  
 
Analysis 
The odd number regressions regress the independent variables on the returns of 
the consumption index (RETCONS), the even regressions regress the independent 
variables on the returns of the infrastructure index (RETINFR). By definition, adding 
more independent variables to the first and second regressions increased the R-squared in 
the third and fourth regressions, enhancing the explanatory power of the model. Overall, 
the intercept is positive and statistically significant for three of the four regressions, 
indicating that if all the other independent variables had coefficients of zero, the returns 
of the consumption and infrastructure indices would still have positive values. This 
suggests that there are other factors that have explanatory power that are not included in 
the regressions. Additionally, another interesting note is the statistical insignificance of 
any of the US macroeconomic variables in predicting the returns. This is highly unusual 
because there are a multitude of studies that have found a relationship between the 
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macroeconomic variables of a country and its stock market (Chen, 2009; Nai-Fu et al., 
1986; Kwon, 1999). 
For the first regression, both independent variables are not statistically significant 
at explaining the dependent variable, but the intercept is significant at the 5% level. 
However, looking at the low R-squared of less than 5% indicates that more variables are 
needed in order to more effectively explain the past trend of the returns on the 
consumption index. Analogously, none of the independent variables are significant in the 
second regression, and the R-squared is double that of the first regression but just as low 
to be inconsequential. Again the intercept is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
In the third model, the Chinese net exports variable (CNETEX) is determined to 
be statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is negative, indicating the 
returns of the consumption companies is positively correlated with imports and 
negatively correlated with exports. As mentioned earlier, exports constitutes a large 
portion of China’s GDP, thus it is of no surprise that the variable is significant at 
explaining the returns of consumption companies. Once again, the changes of 
consumption for both countries are not statistically significant, but the sign for the 
variable for Chinese consumption has changed to reflect a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable. This would indicate that as Chinese consumers increase their 
spending, most of that spending is on the goods and services of the S&P 500 companies. 
In addition, the third regression is the only regression where the intercept is not 
statistically significant.  
In the fourth regression, the investment-related variables are still statistically 
insignificant, and retain the same sign as the second regression. The indicator function for 
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the stimulus package (CSTIM) has become statistically significant at the 10% level. This 
suggests that when the variable had a value of 1, i.e. after the implementation of the 
stimulus package, the returns of the infrastructure index fell. This is evidence that the 
Chinese stimulus package had a negative effect on the S&P 500 industrial companies, 
which may have been caused by Chinese firms crowding out the US firms in China, or 
that the positive effects of the package may have been overshadowed by a variety of 
other factors that pulled down returns that were not included in the regression.  
The results of the regression can only be so meaningful because of the 
considerable roadblocks in procuring data. The analysis is constrained by the lack of data 
available on Chinese variables for English-speaking users. All the large prominent 
international organizations that collect financial and economic data are very limited in 
their collection of data on China. This may be due to the tight control of information that 
the government chooses to release to these international organizations, or the reluctance 
of the organizations to provide unreliable data, that is given from a central government 
that is infamous for fabricating data. This study is forced to use annual data instead of 
higher frequency data, like quarterly or semi-annual data, which may have provided a 
more in depth analysis. To compensate with annual data, data had to be collected as far 
back as 1980 to achieve a larger number of observations, causing the majority of this 
range to be of the normal US business cycle, and diverting focus away from the financial 
crisis, the stimulus package, and the subsequent implications. In addition, with only 
thirty-two observations, this study faces the threat of small sample bias, which may affect 
the validity of the confidence intervals and hypothesis tests. Additionally, data on private 
investment for China is unavailable. Instead, total investment is used as a proxy, whereby 
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it is calculated as GDP less government expenditures, consumption expenditures, and net 
exports. These restrictions may detract from the effectiveness and reliability of this 
analysis. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper’s empirical work applies time series regression technique to several 
companies of the US S&P 500 over the 1981 to 2012 period. The empirical analysis 
begins with basic regression with only two independent variables, and builds on those 
specifications with more complex models containing nine independent variables.  
The results of the model indicate that Chinese net exports is the only variable that 
has explanatory power for the consumption index returns, and the Chinese stimulus 
package indicator function is the only variable that has explanatory power for the 
infrastructure index returns. In addition, because of the statistical significance of the 
intercepts for three out of four of the regressions, it is apparent that there are other 
macroeconomic variables that have more explaining ability than the ones included in the 
regressions.  
However, there are many restraints that prevent a full, in-depth analysis, mainly 
lack of data that is available for non-Chinese users. Thus, it is advisable that investors do 
more research and analysis before making any drastic changes to their models. 
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VII. Appendices 
Figure 1. Returns for the Revised Industrial and Consumption Indices 
 
The blue line represents the returns for the consumption index, the red line represents the 
returns for the industrial index, and the green line represents the returns for the S&P 
index.  
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Figure 2. Correlogram of the First Order Condition for UCONS  
 
The correlogram illustrates that the variable for the US consumption (UCONS) and its 
previous values were correlated.  
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Figure 3. Visual Representation of Correlogram of the First Order Condition for 
UCONS  
 
The figure illustrates the correlogram for the first order condition. The blue lines show 
the autocorrelation for each lag, and the grey area shows the confidence bands at the 5% 
level. The first lag lies outside of the confidence bands, suggesting autocorrelation. 
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Figure 4. Correlogram of the Second Order Condition for UCONS 
 
Below contains a numerical and visual representation of the removal of the correlative 
effect through the second order condition adjustment.  
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Figure 5. Visual Representation of Correlogram of the Second Order Condition for 
UCONS  
 
The figure illustrates the correlogram for the second order condition; i.e. after the 
adjustment for the correlative effects. The blue lines show the autocorrelation for each 
lag, and the grey area shows the confidence bands at the 5% level. It is clear that all of 
the blue lines lie within the confidence bands.  
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Figure 6. Correlation Matrix 
 
The correlation matrix contains the correlation values for all the independent and 
dependent variables after the S&P adjustment.  
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Figure 7. Summary Statistics 
 
The number of observations, means, standard deviations, minimum values, and maximum 
values are found below for all the independent and dependent variables. 
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Table 1. List of Companies, Symbols, and Sectors 
 
The table contains an alphabetical list of US companies that have a relatively large 
market share in China, as well as their respective stock tickers and sectors. These 
companies were aggregated to form the dependent variables in the four regressions.  
 
 
List of Companies, Symbols, and Sectors 
Company Symbol Sector 
Boeing Company BA Industrial 
Caterpillar Inc. CAT Industrial 
Estee Lauder Cos. EL Consumer Goods & 
Services 
General Electric GE Industrial 
The Coca Cola Company KO Consumer Goods & 
Services 
McDonald’s Corp. MCD Consumer Goods & 
Services 
3M Company MMM Industrial 
Nike Inc. NIKE Consumer Goods & 
Services 
Procter & Gamble PG Consumer Goods & 
Services 
Starbucks Corp. SBUX Consumer Goods & 
Services 
Tiffany & Co. TIF Consumer Goods & 
Services 
United Technologies UTX Industrial 
Yum! Brands Inc. YUM Consumer Goods & 
Services 
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Table 2. Additional Notes on the Variables 
 
The table includes the database information and any calculation notes for the independent 
variables. Only credible sources were chosen for this paper; the databases used were 
limited to US government agencies and international groups. 
 
Variable Database Title Calculation 
Notes 
CGOVTS Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
Government Final 
Consumption 
Expenditure in China 
 
CCONS Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
Private Final 
Consumption 
Expenditure in China 
 
CINV World Bank Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), current 
USD 
GDP less 
CGOVTS, 
CCONS, 
CNETEX 
CNETEX IMF International 
Finance Statistics 
Goods, Value of 
Exports, USD; Goods, 
Value of Imports, USD 
Value of Exports 
less Value of 
Imports. 
 
Conversion for 
CGOVTS and 
CCONS 
World Bank Official exchange rate 
(Local currency units 
per US$) 
 
UGOVTS World Bank General Government 
Final Consumption 
Expenditure (current 
USD) 
 
UCONS US Department of 
Commerce: Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Personal Consumption 
Expenditures (PCE) 
 
UINV Federal Reserve of St. 
Louis (FRED) 
Gross Private Domestic 
Investment 
 
 
UNETEX US Department of 
Commerce: Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Net Exports of Goods 
& Services 
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Table 3. Time Series Regression Results 
 
The table contains the coefficients and standard errors for all four regressions. The 
dependent variable for regressions 1 and 3 are the returns for the consumption index 
(RETCONS), the dependent variable for regressions 2 and 4 are the returns for the 
infrastructure index (RETINFR). Individual coefficients are statistically significant at the 
*10%, **5%, or ***1% significance level. Standard errors are found in parenthesis. 
 
Table	  3.	  Time	  Series	  Regression	  Results	  
Regressor	   1	   2	   3	   4	  
ccons	   -­‐0.8382	   	   0.8045	   0.7453	  
	  	   (0.7130)	   	   (1.0336)	   (0.7720)	  
cinv	   	   -­‐0.0867	   0.0062	   -­‐0.0705	  
	  	   	   (0.0532)	   (0.1308)	   (0.0977)	  
cnetex	   	   	   -­‐0.0053***	   -­‐0.0016	  
	  	   	   	   (0.0016)	   (0.0012)	  
cgovts	   	   	   -­‐1.4505	   -­‐1.2821	  
	  	   	   	   (1.3761)	   (1.0277)	  
cstim	   	   	   -­‐0.1711	   -­‐0.2814*	  
	  	   	   	   (0.1992)	  	   (0.1488)	  
ucons	   0.0331	   	   0.0201	   -­‐0.052	  
	  	   (0.1164)	   	   (0.0979)	   (0.0731)	  
uinv	   	   -­‐0.3325	   0.4908	   -­‐0.5843	  
	  	   	   (0.5556)	   (0.8694)	   (0.6493)	  
unetex	   	   	   -­‐0.2905	   0.1255	  
	  	   	   	   (0.2587)	   (0.1932)	  
ugovts	   	   	   0.5887	   0.4531	  
	  	   	   	   (1.0657)	   (0.7959)	  
Intercept	   0.2367**	   0.2339***	   0.1455	   0.2439***	  
	  	   (0.1087)	   (0.0562)	   (0.1126)	   (0.0841)	  
R-­‐squared	   0.0483	   0.1164	   0.6788	   0.5528	  
N	   32	   32	   32	   32	  
 
 
